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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE 
ANTITRUST LAWS 
THEODORE J. ST. ANTOINE 
University of Michigan Law School 
A central aim of the antitrust laws is the promotion of competi­
tion. A central aim of collective bargaining is the elimination of 
competition-according to classical trade union theory, the elimina­
tion of wage competition among all employees doing the same job in 
the same industry_! Given these disparate aims, the antitrust laws and 
collective bargaining will almost inevitably tend to clash. To har­
monize them, the type of competition which the law is intended to 
foster must be carefully distinguished from the type of competition 
which union-employer bargaining can properly displace. The Su­
preme Court's last major effort to draw the demarcation line pro­
duced the Pennington2 and J ewe! Tea3 decisions of 1965. 
Even more than other leading Supreme Court decisions, I find 
that Pennington and J ewe! Tea provide a sort of Rorschach test for 
their commentators. The observer looks into the Justices' opinions 
and sees reflected those elements of the labor-antitrust problem 
which have always fascinated him. Since I participated as union 
counsel in these cases, I suspect I am peculiarly disposed to this 
reaction. Nonetheless, I believe some of the most novel and poten­
tially most significant thinking of the Court can best be understood 
in light of the union arguments in the 1965 cases. So I will risk the 
charge of egocentricity, and begin there. 
EARLY LIMITATIONS ON ANTITRUST LIABILITY 
Prior to Pennington and J ewe! Tea, two quite different legal 
theories were thought available to shield labor activities from anti­
trust attack. First, and best known, was the so-called "union exemp­
tion" established in the Hutcheson4 case. Activity immunized against 
injunctions by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, read to-
' See, e.g., Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industria.[ Democracy (London : 
Longmans, Green, 1902) ,  pp. 173-177. 
2 United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965 ) .  
3 Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 
(1965 ) .  
' United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 ( 1941 ) .  
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gether, was not to be deemed an offense under the Sherman Act. The 
effect was to exempt from antitrust regulation peaceful, nonfraudu­
lent union conduct in the course of a labor dispute, as long as a union 
acts in its own interest and does not combine with nonlabor groups. 
The corollary to this, however, as Allen Bradley5 made clear, was that 
labor organizations lose their immunity when they "aid nonlabor 
groups to create business monopolies and to control the marketing 
of goods and services." Only when "acting alone" are unions exempt 
from Sherman Act coverage. 
When do unions "act alone" ? Presumably when they strike, 
picket, or boycott. When a union is engaged in organizational battles, 
therefore, the Hutcheson doctrine serves it admirably. But when a 
union has finally won recognition from an employer or group of 
employers, and enters into a collective bargaining relationship, can 
it any longer be said to be "acting alone" ? Or do its agreements now 
become subject to scrutiny under the antitrust laws ? 
This problem might be finessed if unions could resuscitate and 
amplify a second (and older ) theory limiting antitrust liability. In 
the Apex H osiery6 opinion Justice Stone had said that the Sherman 
Act was intended to outlaw only "restraints of trade" as understood at 
common law, that is, restraints on "commercial competition in the 
marketing of goods or services . . . .  so substantial as to affect mar­
ket prices." But "an elimination of price competition based on dif­
ferences in labor standards" was not prohibited. 
Now, Apex itself dealt with a sit-down strike, obviously involving 
a union "acting alone." If Justice Stone's words could be taken at face 
value, however, they totally removed from antitrust coverage re­
straints on competition "based on differences in labor standards." 
This was not a matter of a statutory "union exemption" ; the Sherman 
Act, as written, would simply not apply to a certain class of restraints. 
Employers, or employers in combination with unions, would be as free 
as unions "acting alone" to halt competition grounded in wage dif­
ferentials.7 In short, the Sherman Act would be confined to restraints 
on the product market, and the labor market would be beyond its ken. 
• Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 808 ( 1945 ) .  
• Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495, 500, 503 ( 1940) . 
• On the immunity of agreements among employers dealing with labor 
standards, see Kennedy v. Long Island Railroad Co., 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 830 ( 1963 ) .  
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PENNINGTON 
In Pennington it was alleged that the United Mine Workers and 
the major coal producers had conspired to drive smaller, less efficient 
operators out of business by establishing a uniform industry-wide 
wage rate higher than the small producers could afford. If true, the 
allegation would make it hard for the UMW to rely on the Hutcheson 
exemption for a union "acting along." Yet the competition which 
was to be elminated was competition "based on differences in labor 
standards," and thus arguably the Apex doctrine came into play. 
Moreover, wages are at the core of those subjects about which unions 
and employers are required to bargain under the National Labor Re­
lations Act. These so-called "mandatory bargaining subjects," the 
unions argued, should be equated with Justice Stone's "labor stand­
ards." Surely a matter on which the labor laws compelled bargaining 
could not be the basis of a prosecution under the antitrust laws ! 
Inherent in this argument, of course, was the notion that the "pur­
pose" of any wage pact is irrelevant-even if the purpose is to liqui­
date competitors. This proved the fatal flaw. But the flaw is perhaps 
more apparent in the abstract than in the concrete ; it is probably eas­
ier to say a union and employers may not have a "predatory purpose" 
in a wage agreement than to determine, in any given case, what is the 
purpose. And the history of judicial assessment of union "purpose" 
is hardly reassuring. 
At any rate, Justice White in delivering the opinion of the Court 
in Pennington was plainly troubled by the union argument, but he 
didn't buy it. He conceded that the bounds of the duty to bargain 
under the National Labor Relations Act have "great relevance" in 
considering the scope of labor's antitrust immunity.8 He then pro­
ceeded, however, to turn the union argument into a boomerang as 
applied to Pennington by introducing the new concept that the statu­
tory duty to bargain exists only on a unit-by-unit basis. Unions and 
employers must negotiate about the wages and employment standards 
of workers in a particular bargaining unit, but apparently not about 
the standards outside a given unit. Thus, a union "forfeits" its anti­
trust "exemption" when it is "clearly shown" that it has agreed with 
one group of employers "to impose a certain wage scale on other bar­
gaining units."9 Moreover, a union is "liable" if it becomes a party 
8 381 U.S. at 665. 
8 Ibid. 
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to an employer conspiracy to eliminate competitors, even though the 
union's role is limited to securing certain wages, hours, or working 
conditions from the other employers. 
This approach immediately raises a fistful of new questions. To 
begin with, Justice White suggests a distinction between the union's 
loss of antitrust immunity and its commission of a substantive viola­
tion. 10 Does this mean an agreement with extra-unit implications 
merely removes the exemption, without necessarily resulting in a 
per se violation ? If so, what added elements must be shown to estab­
lish an offense ? As you know, the Supreme Court long ago declared 
that only "unreasonable" restraints on trade run afoul of the Sherman 
Act.11 It may well be that resort to the "rule of reason" will enable 
the courts to exercise considerable flexibility in dealing with "extra­
unit" agreements. A substantive violation might require a "predatory 
intent," a definite "purpose" to impede or destroy business competi­
tors. The trial court on the remand in Pennington in effect so held.12 
I would contend this result is supported by the practical demands 
of meaningful collective bargaining ; as we shall discuss in a moment, 
there are times when it is simply unrealistic to insist that an employer 
has no valid interest in the wage scale a union gets from the employ­
er's competitors. 
Another inquiry is whether the Supreme Court was proposing a 
special evidentiary standard in declaring that the extra-unit agreement 
must be "clearly shown." The Court explicitly refrained from passing 
on the sufficiency of the evidence in Pennington. Before a union can 
be held liable for the acts of an agent, "clear proof" of the authorizing 
of the acts is required by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, one of the statu­
tory bases of labor's antitrust exemption. I recognize the desirability 
of finding some way to insulate union-employer bargaining from ill­
founded inferences of "conspiracy" by overly suspicious or credulous 
juries. But I confess I think it takes a bit of stretching to extend 
Norris-LaGuardia's agency provision far enough to cover the antitrust 
evidentiary question. Nonethless, the district court which handled 
Pennington on remand expressly held that Norris-LaGuardia makes 
10 See also Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 
676, 689 (1965 ) .  
11 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 ( 1911 ) ; 
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 ( 1911 ) .  Cf. Chicago 
Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 ( 1918) (trading rules for 
commodity exchanges) 
" Lewis v. Pennington, 59 LRRM 2423, 53 LC 1J 1 1,371 (E.D. Tenn. 1966).  
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"clear proof" necessary to establish predatory intent.13 Perhaps it 
would be more straightforward to say that a proper reconciliation of 
antitrust and labor policies calls for the Sherman Act to be inter­
preted, without reference to Norris-LaGuardia, as requiring evidence 
of an explicit union-employer agreement to force competitors out of 
business before a case could go to a jury. Mere knowledge that some 
marginal operators could not pay the prescribed industry wage scale 
would not, in itself, be sufficient.14 
The practical implications of Pennington's new unit-by-unit bar­
gaining rule are illustrated by the so-called "most favored nation" 
clause. This is a fairly common provision in labor contracts, espe­
cially in the construction industry, requiring the union to give the 
signatory employer the benefit of the most favorable terms the union 
subsequently accords any other employer. In actual operation, nat­
urally, the usual effect is to freeze labor standards at the level of the 
initial contract. In the language of Pennington, the union has agreed, 
at least impliedly, "to impose a certain wage scale on other bargaining 
units." This undoubtedly is a form of restraint, but is it not just 
another way of advancing the accepted labor policy of taking wages 
out of competition ? In any event, a union recently charged an em­
ployer with a refusal to bargain under the National Labor Relations 
Act for insisting on a "most favored nation" clause, and the General 
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a complaint 
"to place the issue before the Board."15 The General Counsel acted 
quite correctly, considering Justice White's dictum that mandatory 
bargaining is confined to working conditions in an individual unit. 
But the Board should not feel itself foreclosed by Pennington's sweep­
ing talk about units (which may command the assent of only three 
Justices) 16 from making an independent appraisal of the problem. 
What, after all, is more natural than for an employer to want as­
surance that his competitors will have to match any concessions he 
gives the union ? As long as we endorse the policy of eliminating 
competition based on wage cutting, I see no reason to boggle at a 
"' Ibid. See also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) . 
" Justices Douglas, Black, and Clark, concurring in Pennington, apparently 
would regard the wage agreement under such circumstances as "prima facie" 
evidence of a violation. 381 U.S. at 673. 
'" 63 BNA, Labor Relations Reporter 199 ( Nov. 7, 1966).  16 The three concurring Justices made no mention of unit-by-unit bargaining, 
and simply declared that a union-employer agreement to set a high wage scale 
for the purpose of forcing marginal producers out of business would be in 
violation of the antitrust laws. 
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means so well adapted to attaining that end. Indeed, I find it  hard 
to imagine how collective bargaining could stay healthy if discussion 
were choked off on some of the most vital subjects-the competitive 
position of various firms in an industry, the demands the union will 
make in other negotiations, and so on. And I see no essential differ­
ence between permitting discussion and permitting agreement, so long 
as there is no specific purpose of killing off competition. I find un­
persuasive Justice White's argument that a union cannot be allowed 
to "straitjacket" itself in subsequent bargaining by commitments to 
"favored" employers in earlier negotiations. Those commitments may 
be the price the union has to pay to get the concessions in the first 
place. The employees in the original unit will hardly complain. The 
employees in the other units are more likely to gain than to lose when 
a "floor" is placed under wages. In the long run, upholding "most fa­
vored nation" provisions would probably do no more than hasten what 
the labor economists in this group know better than I is the usual re­
sult of union organization anyway, namely, the gradual "leveling" of 
wage rates throughout an industry. 
The plight of the employer charged with an unfair labor practice 
because of Pennington underscores another important aspect of this 
decision. Its impact falls not so much upon organized labor as upon 
the institution of collective bargaining. Indeed, Justice White stressed 
that a union acting unilaterally, in furtherance of its own policies, still 
has the right to seek uniform wages in an industry. It is only when 
this is done pursuant to a union-employer agreement that antitrust 
issues arise. But Pennington applied literally may seriously hamstring 
collective bargaining as an instrument for coping with today's critical 
problems in industrial relations. For example, management's need 
to introduce technological improvements to increase productivity 
and meet competition is countered by labor's anxiety over the possible 
loss of job security and craft skills. Reconciling these opposing inter­
ests through attritional reductions in force, retraining allowances, and 
so forth, may be severely hampered if employers cannot be reassured 
on what will be demanded of their competitors. 
The "most favored nation" clause can stand as a symbol of a whole 
range of activities which may be broadly classified as "pattern bar­
gaining"-efforts by either unions or employers to obtain uniform 
labor contracts governing separate bargaining units. Since I have no 
time to deal with the many questions presented, let me just mention 
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two typical issues : Is it an antitrust violation (or an unfair labor 
practice) for two or more unions to coordinate bargaining policy with 
respect to different units of the same business ? Is it an antitrust vio­
lation ( or an unfair labor practice) for employers, in the absence of 
a formal multi-employer unit, to adopt common bargaining strategy or 
tactics, for instance, to agree upon joint lockouts in case one employer 
is struck ? 
JEWEL TEA 
In Pennington a key question was whether a labor agreement deal­
ing with wages would violate the antitrust laws if its purpose was to 
put certain competitors out of business. The answer was "yes." In 
Jewel Tea the question was quite different. Was it a violation of the 
Sherman Act for a butchers' union to compel a grocery chain to 
agree to a limitation on the hours fresh meat could be sold, after the 
union had entered into a multi-employer contract containing such a 
restriction ? In essence, as viewed by a majority of the Court, the prob­
lem was one of characterization : Did this clause involve wages, hours, 
or working conditions, legitimate subjects of collective bargaining, or 
did it constitute a forbidden 'restraint on the product market ? 
The Court split three ways, with three Justices in each group. 
Justice White, Chief Justice Warren, and Justice Brennan found that 
the marketing hours restriction, which in effect defined the butchers' 
working hours and their job content, was "intimately related" to labor 
conditions. Thus the union's effort to secure the provision through 
arm's-length bargaining in pursuit of its own labor policies, and not in 
furtherance of a union-employer conspiracy, was exempt under the 
Sherman Act. Justices Goldberg, Harlan, and Stewart concurred for 
the same reasons that led them to dissent in Pennington. They ac­
cepted the union argument that agreements dealing with mandatory 
subjects of bargaining are wholly outside the antitrust laws. Justices 
Douglas, Black, and Clark dissented in Jewel Tea on the ground the 
operating hours limitation was an obvious restraint on the product 
market, and was not needed to fix employees' working hours. The 
multi-employer collective agreement itself was considered sufficient 
to show an illegal union-employer conspiracy to .impose the marketing 
hours restriction on the holdout chain. 
No single opinion in Jewel Tea represents the views of a major­
ity of the Court. Rather than focus on the decision itself, therefore, 
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I am going to examine two long-standing legal issues on which Jewel 
Tea has revived debate. 
First, if a union is protected by Hutcheson's exemption for a union 
"acting alone" when it strikes an employer over a particular bargain­
ing demand, does it follow that a collective agreement granting that 
demand, even an agreement signed by a group of employers, is like­
wise immune to antitrust scrutiny ? It has been argued that it would 
be an intolerable paradox to sanction economic warfare while out­
lawing the peace treatyP The anomaly may not be decisive ; the 
Supreme Court, for example, accepts the anomaly that state right-to­
work laws may be invoked against union security agreements but not 
against strikes to obtain them.18 On the other hand, certain language 
in Allen Bradley could be read to mean that a union commits a viola­
tion only when it participates in a preexisting employer conspiracy.19 
Although Justice White would not immunize the agreement in Jewel 
Tea merely because it was between a union and a single employer, he 
emphasized that the union was acting in pursuit of its own labor poli­
cies and not at the behest of any employers.20 This adds some weight 
to the notion that the source of the impulse for a particular provision 
may be crucial. A clause which would be barred by the antitrust laws 
if sought by employers may remain within the "union exemption" if 
sought by a labor organization. My difficulty with this is that I am 
skeptical about maintaining a neat dichotomy between union- and 
employer-motivated contract provisions. One side raises a problem 
in negotiations ; the other proposes a solution ; the first party modifies 
the suggestion. To whom do we ascribe the final product ? I doubt 
whether the "source" test can be conclusive, although evidence of a 
clause's source may occasionally aid in determining its relation to 
working conditions. 
The second problem spotlighted by Jewel Tea is what standard 
should be used to distinguish between agreements properly concerned 
with wages, hours, and other components of the labor market, and 
17 Cox, "Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis,'' 104 Univ. 
Pa. L. Rev. 252, 271 (1955) .  See also Republic Productions v. Musicians, 245 
F. Supp. 475 ( S.D.N.Y. 1965 ) .  But cf. Report of the Attorney General's 
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws (Washington, 1955 ) ,  pp. 
297-299. 
18 Retail Clerks Loca1 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 105 ( 1963 ) .  
19 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 809 ( 1945 ) .  
•• Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. J ewe! Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 
688-690 ( 1965 ) .  
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agreements improperly concerned with the product market. Unlike 
the wage contract in Pennington, which in and of itself involved only 
a restraint on the labor market, the contract in Jewel Tea involved 
both a restraint on the labor market (a defining of the butchers' work­
ing hours and their job content ) and a restraint on the product market 
(a  restriction on the hours for selling fresh meat ) .  Justice White 
assumed that if the agreement had dealt directly only with the product 
market (a fixing of a price schedule for the meat, for example) , 
with any benefit to the employees merely an indirect consequence, it 
would not have been immune to the antitrust laws. What saved the 
Jewel Tea provision in his eyes was that the marketing-hours restric­
tion was "intimately related" to wages, hours, and working conditions. 
The trial court had found as a fact that self-service meat sales were 
unfeasible, and therefore a limitation on operating hours was neces­
sary to preserve the butchers' jobs and working hours. 
In sustaining the agreement's exemption from the antitrust laws 
in this situation, Justice White at one point seemed to be "weighing" 
the employees' interests in labor standards against the admittedly ad­
verse effects on product competition.21 Apparently for Justice White, 
any showing of an "immediate and legitimate" employee concern 
, would be enough to tip the scales to the side of the union. My reaction 
to this approach is rather mixed. First, any reintroduction of the 
pre-Norris-LaGuardia judicial technique of "balancing" the social 
plusses and minuses of union objectives must be viewed with some 
apprehension. But, second, if such balancing is to be indulged in, it 
should not be just an armchair exercise. A dozen years ago Archi­
bald Cox observed that there was "no reliable information on the 
extent or economic importance of union efforts to shelter employers 
from competition in the product market." 22 As well as I can tell, 
things stand today as they stood then. If Pennington and Jewel Tea 
are to presage a resurgence of labor antitrust litigation ( so far there 
has been surprisingly little ) ,  it would indeed be unfortunate for the 
Court to have to resolve some of the legal issues posed without more 
enlightenment on the economic realities. This is especially true in 
view of the improved tools for empirical research that have been 
developed in the past decade. I should hope that some of the econo­
mists and lawyers in the present group would be ready to work 
together to provide the necessary enlightenment. 
21 I d. at 691. 
22 Cox, op. cit. supra note 17, p. 272. 
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CoNCLUSION 
Pennington establishes that unions and employers violate the anti­
trust laws when they execute a labor contract whose purpose is to 
eliminate competitors, even if the agreement deals only with wages, 
hours, and working conditions. My feeling is that in the absence of 
such a predatory purpose there should be no substantive violation, 
regardless of whether antitrust "immunity" is lost because the contract 
covers labor standards outside a particular bargaining unit. 
Jewel Tea indicates that even a direct restraint on the product 
market is exempt from the antitrust laws if the restraint is also 
"intimately related" to wages, hours, and other components of the 
labor market, at least where the union securing the agreement is acting 
on its own and not at the behest of employers. If the Court is hinting 
at a possible return to some effort to "weigh" the workers' stake in 
their job standards against the public's stake in a competitive economy, 
I suggest there is an urgent need for empirical data to enable the 
courts to strike a reasonably informed balance. Antitrust policy too 
readily tends to become a special branch of moral philosophy, and 
involvement with labor questions is likely to aggravate that tendency. 
"Weighing" interests here is risky business at best, but in any event 
the operation should be performed as far as possible with the humbler, 
and more appropriate, instruments of economic analysis. 
